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Abstract 
The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function 
of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a 
concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the 
history of biology, and frequently in very normative ways, also shifting between the biological 
and the social. Indeed, it has often been presented as a key-concept in life science and the 
‘theorization’ of Life, but conversely has also been the target of influential rejections: as just an 
instrument of transmission for the selfish gene, but also, historiographically, as part of an 
outdated ‘vitalism’. Indeed, the organism, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the 
‘body’ than to the ‘molecule’, is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical investments 
presenting it as essential, sometimes even as the pivot of a science or a particular approach to 
nature, while other approaches reject or attack it with equal force, assimilating it to a 
mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of non-causal forces, or other pseudo-scientific doctrines. This 
paper does not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific validity 
or historical coherence; nor does it return to the well-studied issue of the organism-mechanism 
tension in biology. Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the emergence and transformation 
of the concept of organism, but has not emphasized so much the way in which organism is a 
shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as ‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their 
metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by others, over and against the natural world. 
The organism as go-between concept is also a hybrid, a boundary concept or an epistemic limit 
case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of ‘nomadic concepts’. Thereby the concept of 
organism continues to function in different contexts – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, 
a model of order, of regulation, etc. – despite having frequently been pronounced irrelevant 
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and reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics 
of organism’, or organismic biology. 
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 Introduction 
The organism is neither a discovery like the circulation of the blood or the glycogenic function 
of the liver, nor a particular biological theory like epigenesis or preformationism. It is rather a 
concept which plays a series of roles – sometimes overt, sometimes masked – throughout the 
history of biology, and frequently in very ‘valuative’ or normative ways, also shifting between 
the biological and the social (Canguilhem 2002, Métraux 1998, Gissis 2009). Indeed, it has often 
been presented as a key-concept in life science and the ‘theorization’ of Life (for instance, in 
the sense that biology is a science of organisms or is nothing; Grene and Depew 2004). 
Similarly, at a more conceptual level, perhaps because it is experientially closer to the ‘body’ 
than to the ‘molecule’, the organism is often the object of quasi-affective theoretical 
investments presenting it as essential, perhaps even as the pivot of a science or a particular 
approach to nature (from Hegel onwards, and explicitly with thinkers such as Kurt Goldstein 
and, with more metaphysical investment, Hans Jonas; see Wolfe 2004, 2010). Conversely, it has 
also been the target of some influential rejections, classically in Dawkins’ vision of the organism 
as just an instrument of transmission for the selfish gene (Dawkins 1976), but also, at a 
historiographic level, as a denunciation of ‘vitalism’ in the history of science (Schiller 1978) or, 
as Laublicher has noted, in the kinds of attacks that go beyond scientific claims and counter-
claims (Laubichler 2000), assimilating its concept to a mysterious ‘vitalist’ ontology of non-
causal forces, or some other ‘pre’- or ‘pseudo’-scientific doctrine; or at least, “a highly 
contestable notion” (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, p. 173). 
Here, I do not seek to adjudicate between these debates, either in terms of scientific 
validity or historical coherence; nor do I return to the classic issue of the organism-mechanism 
tension which has particularly been studied in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
biology (Hein 1972, Allen 2005). It has been observed that we have numerous histories of 
genetics, but no history of organism (Laubichler 2000). We have studies of the emergence and 
displacements of the term (Cheung 2006) but not of the shifts in concepts of organism as parts 
(or foundations!) of a science (Peterson 2010 is a step in this direction, for twentieth-century 
organicism). Recent scholarship has begun to focus on the transformation of the concept of 
organism (Huneman and Wolfe eds., 2010), but there is an aspect that has not been 
emphasized so much (except perhaps under the heading of ‘metaphors of organism’ in 
Schlanger 1971): the way in which organism is a shifting, ‘go-between’ concept – invoked as 
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‘natural’ by some thinkers to justify their metaphysics, but then presented as value-laden by 
others over and against the natural world. It can also be described as a hybrid (sometimes 
expressing a kind of complex mechanistic view, sometimes a foundational subjectivity), a 
boundary concept or an epistemic limit case, all of which partly overlap with the idea of 
‘nomadic concepts’. 
 
1. 
The hybrid character of the concept of organism, which functions alternatively as a 
functional and ontological go-between, and as a polemical concept can serve as a defense of 
the concept, by showing that it continues to function – as a heuristic, an explanatory challenge, 
a model of order, of regulation, etc. – in different contexts despite having frequently been 
pronounced ‘caduc’, irrelevant, reduced to molecules or genes. Yet this perpetuation is far 
removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology. In earlier work on the 
concept of organism I first made a case for an instrumentalist concept (Wolfe 2004), which 
would dissolve ontological debates between reductionist and heavily organismic approaches to 
the nature or individuality of living beings; more recently (Wolfe 2010) I argued for a weakly 
ontological view in which organizational concepts, from Montpellier vitalism and Claude 
Bernard to William Bechtel and Alvaro Moreno et al., were the ‘realest’ yet also least 
ideological concept of organism. While I return to what I’ll call ‘weak organicism’ in the last 
sections of this essay, I will be more interested here in these reality claims as part of a broader 
phenomenon of hybridity, borrowing, transplantation and displacement. 
Indeed, one can ask the question of the very existence of the organism, as the journal 
American Zoologist did a few decades ago – one article in this issue is entitled “Do organisms 
exist?”, Ruse 1989), or as philosophers and theoretical biologists have more recently (Wolfe 
2004, Cheung 2006, Huneman and Wolfe, eds., 2010, Toepfer 2013). This ontological question – 
does the organism exist or not? or is it just an artefact, an effect or quasi-anthropomorphic 
projection of the human mind? – derives from the frequent judgment in molecular biology, 
according to which biology progresses by ‘molecularization’ (Morange 1997), which should lead 
to the disappearance of ‘older’ concepts such as organism. In reaction, it is often suggested that 
such concepts have a purely instrumental status, as more or less useful constructs which can be 
discarded as science progresses. The instrumentalist could say of the organism what Buffon said 
famously of species, that it is not a natural kind but a ‘constructed’ category, an “abstract,” 
“general” and temporary construct of the mind, or “vue de l’esprit”1: a projection onto the 
                                                             
1 For Buffon, species is not a natural kind but an “abstract,” “general” and temporary construct of the mind (“notre 
ouvrage”) which is the result of comparing individuals to each other (Buffon [1753], “L’âne,” pp. 384-385). His 
successor Lacépède explicitly describes species as a “vue de l’esprit,” a mental construct, in his commentary and 
extension of Buffon’s work (Lacépède [1800], “Sur la durée des espèces,” p. xxxiii). 
 
4 
 
world which enables us to grasp it otherwise than as a heap of dead matter or a chaos of atoms 
in motion; in other words, a heuristic construct. 
I am leaving aside the old Aristotelian question of organisms as individual substances, 
that is, the idea that it is a ‘fact’, either of our intuition or of nature, that organisms, particularly 
mid-size entities, represent paradigms for our idea of individuals; as James Lennox puts it, for 
Aristotle, “paradigm natural substances were not the common material constituents of the 
universe, but the most active, complex and organized of bodies, the living ones” (Lennox, 2001, 
pp. 108-109); recent work in biology challenges some of these intuitions, from the work 
focusing on the role of the bacteria in our gut in maintaining our immunological individuality 
(Pradeu 2012) to corals and forests (Bouchard 2006). These are fascinating questions, but 
belong to a separate, specifically metaphysical dimension of the issue. My aim here is not to 
defend a metaphysical thesis on the nature of biological individuality, or to illustrate its radical 
denial in favor of evolving scientific change (as in Rosenberg’s instrumentalism: Rosenberg 
1989) in some historical cases, despite how the hybridity described here could sound 
‘instrumentalist’. Significant metaphysical theses that could be used in support of an irreducible 
organism concept include the ‘animalism’ defended by Eric Olson (in which our personal 
identity is defined by our biology in the sense that we are ‘human animals’ more fundamentally 
than we are Lockean psychological persons defined by the continuity of their thoughts, Olson 
1997) and the form of Aristotelian substantivalism defended by David Wiggins, which invokes 
“an unmysterious but pre-empiricist notion of substance” (Wiggins, 2001, p. 80). But whether a 
substrate, a total system of interrelations, or some other ‘substance’, these theories are 
competing claims concerning the nature of a real organismic identity. Instead, my analysis 
tends to show how the organism concept is always borrowed from some other realm (from the 
metaphysical to the physical or inversely; or from the physical to the biological, or from the 
biological to the social), as a go-between, yet a go-between with a genuine conceptual 
dimension.2 
From the heyday of psychophysics in the nineteenth century to the triumphant 
reductionist proclamations of biochemists from Emil Du Bois-Reymond to Jacques Loeb in the 
next generations, in diverse, not particularly homogeneous scientific trajectories, we often 
encounter the assertion that the organism has been replaced by molecular explanations. 
Additionally, the properly philosophical analogue of these ‘empirical’ reductionist claims is 
Ernest Nagel’s effort to restate the teleological language of organismic biology in purely 
mechanistic terms (Nagel 1961). Sometimes this reduction, elimination or otherwise, erasure of 
organism is presented in negative terms (as a loss of meaning, a dehumanization, etc.), but 
                                                             
2 In that sense, my analysis is located halfway between the aforementioned metaphysical perspective (are 
organisms, i.e. biological individuals in this context, real? in what sense? Substance, process, interrelation of parts, 
continuity of consciousness, etc.?) and the study of organisms as metaphors (Schlanger 1971) or as epistemic 
things (Rheinberger 1997a). 
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more often it is presented as a neutral statement of fact: “both scientists and philosophers take 
ontological reduction for granted… Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that” (Hull, 
1981, p. 282). Yet such neutral statements sometimes have implicit normative content, namely, 
recommending that we no longer do revisionary metaphysics of organism, understood as the 
project of revising our scientific worldpicture to supplement it with something additional 
(whether this be an ‘entelechy’, as in Driesch, a ‘drive’ as in E.S. Russell or an ‘organismic law’ as 
in Elsasser). 
Similarly, despite the presence and even usefulness of the (or ‘an’) organism concept in 
disciplines such as embryology, ethology or evolutionary biology (Pepper and Heron 2008), 
some researchers in fundamental biology (Di Paolo 2009) end up stating that life itself does not 
exist. This recalls the claim that Life is no longer an object of empirical research, as in François 
Jacob ‘s famous pronouncement: “We no longer inquire into Life today in laboratories” (“On 
n’interroge plus la vie aujourd’hui dans les laboratoires”: Jacob, 1970, p. 320), which in fact has 
also been observed historically about nineteenth-century experimental life science: 
“Treviranus’ question ‘What is life?’ had . . . ceased to stand as the practical starting point for 
physiological research” (Coleman, 1977, p. 13). More recently, Edouard Machery has argued 
(Machery 2012) that we should give up seeking to provide definitions of life, as these are either 
folk concepts, or unresolvable with other competing definitions: namely, evolutionists, 
theoretical biologists, self-organization theorists, molecular biochemists and artificial life 
researchers cannot agree on a definition.  
While Machery’s point is well taken,3 one could observe (a) that there is a reality to 
certain life-concepts – I shall speak instead of forms of organization (Bechtel 2007, Mossio and 
Moreno 2010, Moreno and Mossio forthcoming), here, that of organism – and (b) that there is 
a particular productivity of the organism if it is understood as a go-between, not as some 
archaic vital substance or irreducible individuality.  The organism in this desubstantialized yet 
real sense need not (indeed, cannot) be taken in the fearful emotional sense of anti-
reductionist ‘biophilosophers’ like Raymond Ruyer (prominent in post-war French thought and 
something of an influence on thinkers including Georges Canguilhem and Gilles Deleuze). Ruyer, 
in this quite close to a tradition of Romantic biophilosophy that was mainly present in Germany, 
wants to withdraw the organism from any possible mechanist explanations, insisting on its non-
spatiality and sheer potentiality (Ruyer, 1946, pp. 8, 14, 27, 58, 94). Ruyer’s fear of a universe 
composed of inanimate matter, with shocks and displacements explainable exhaustively by the 
laws of mechanics, a universe in which the organism is no longer anything more than a 
machine, leads him to warn: “If you are shocked by what amounts to a generalized ‘theory of 
                                                             
3 I have offered some criticisms of my own against ‘criteria-based’ theories of organism, which he calls 
‘definitional’, in Wolfe forthcoming. 
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organism’, . . . you had better see clearly that the choice is between this theory and that of a 
‘generalized molecule’” (Ruyer, 1952, p. 166). 
So on the one hand, the organism is an oppositional concept, often with polemical 
and/or affective value: it serves to assert one ‘realm’, one ontological or scientific domain over 
and against another (the physical universe as a whole; mechanism; inanimate matter; forms of 
life below the threshold of consciousness – for defenders of the concept of organism, however 
diverse they may be, viz. Walter Elsasser and Hans Jonas share neither a metaphysical nor a 
scientific outlook, do not tend to be interested in ‘microorganisms’ or forms of life such as the 
amoeba or the protozoa. Von Uexküll’s tick would be something of a counterexample, for it is 
an empirical case meant to justify a holist theory of organism, in which each organism lives in a 
dynamically constituted Umwelt which is unique to that organism: ticks perceive only that 
which is relevant to them, just as dogs and seahorses do. Organisms on this view are “closed 
unit[s]” (von Uexküll, 2010, p. 42), as are their Umwelten: “Each environment forms a self-
enclosed unit, which is governed in all its parts by its meaning for the subject” (p. 144). Von 
Uexküll’s further holist emphasis is that we should understand the tick, like every other 
organism, as a “subject” rather than as a “machine”: “The biologist . . . takes into account that 
each and every living thing is a subject that lives in its own world, of which it is the center. It 
cannot, therefore, be compared to a machine” (p. 45). Von Uexküll’s tick, like Kurt Goldstein’s 
brain-damaged patients (Noppeney 2001), is not a model organism but rather a paradigm case 
of organism as an irreducible, individual substance.4  
But on the other hand, organism is a hybrid concept. I am not using this term in a special 
technical sense in which ‘hybridity’ would have a specified theoretical meaning. Rather, I simply 
mean that from its early argumentative usage onwards (i.e., as a term of argument, not a casual 
or obscure term), through its trials and tribulations as a key term of biology or a term to be 
rejected, organism is used a hybrid sense. I mean by this that one author will use the organism 
concept to give metaphysical grounding to an empirical claim, while another author will insist 
that it is purely empirical – not to mention further instances of hybridity between the biological 
and the social (Gissis 2009), the biological and the neuropsychological, and so on. 
Its earliest ‘conceptual’ usage, that is, not its very earliest usage (which seems to have 
been in the fourth edition of John Evelyn’s Sylva, 1706, first published in 1664: Cheung, 2006, p. 
322) but its usage as a conceptual or technical term was in the debate between Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg-Ernest Stahl in the early years of the eighteenth century, based on 
Leibniz’s reply to Stahl’s Theoria medica vera (1707), and the ensuing controversy between the 
two authors. This ultimately bore the title Animadversiones circa Assertiones aliquas Theoriae 
                                                             
4 Goldstein credits von Uexküll explicitly for this concept. In addition, it is not irrelevant that Von Uexküll was one 
of the founders of theoretical biology as a discipline, authoring what is probably the first work to bear that title 
(von Uexküll 1926). 
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Medicae Verae clarii Stahlii, cum ejusdem Leibnitii ad Stahlianas observationes responsionibus 
or, more unkindly, Negotium otiosum (Huneman and Rey 2007, Duchesneau forthcoming).5 (I 
say ‘conceptual’ or ‘technical’ usage because the term is used even after Leibniz, e.g. in the 
Encyclopédie – where it does occur, contrary to the claims of earlier scholars – in a yet 
undefined sense, as synonymous with ‘mechanism’.6) In the next sections (2 and 3) I address 
some particular historical cases, from the Leibniz-Stahl debate to eighteenth-century 
Montpellier vitalism, in order to further illustrate the fruitfulness of this hybrid, non-essential, 
and perpetually nomadic concept of organism. I then contrast this concept with a stronger form 
of organicism (section 4) before concluding. 
 
2. 
While Stahl insists on the ontological uniqueness of organism, Leibniz, for whom 
“everything in nature is to be explained mechanically” (Leibniz, first essay on Stahl, 1708, cited 
from the bilingual edition in Carvallo, 2004, p. 73) and who often explains bodies in terms of 
size, shape and motion, discusses organisms as particular, but special cases of a mechanical 
universe: he calls them “machines of nature” (Fichant 2003). The term ‘organism’ is often 
presented as first appearing in his New System of Nature, published in 1695 in the Journal des 
savants, but he uses it in Latin and German as well (and in a short 1686 text entitled “Du 
rapport général de toutes choses,” he speaks of “all the parts of matter” as being “full of 
organism” (pleines d’organisme): # 311 in Leibniz, 1999, p. 1614). But Leibniz primarily uses the 
term “machines of nature,” which he defines as machines in their most minute parts 
(“moindres parties”), contrary to machines created by human artifice (Leibniz, 1978, IV, p. 482); 
machines down to infinity, also in the sense that bodies contain seeds which can never be 
destroyed (ibid., p. 475); some of this language (infinity and interrelation of parts) is also in 
Malebranche. In the Monadology (§ 64) he presents this terminology as a definition of living 
bodies. We should notice that the Leibnizian ‘organism’, in this sense, is a complex kind of 
machine: “The organism of a living being (organismus viventium) is nothing other than a divine 
mechanism which is more subtle than an ordinary mechanism in the infinity of its subtlety” 
(Leibniz, 1961, 16, § 13; Leibniz, 1978, I, p. 15). Leibniz denies any kind of extra-causal influence 
on bodies of a vital principle that would be separate from bodies as a whole, which is precisely 
what Stahl’s anima is: soul as the motive force or controller in the body. 
                                                             
5
 Leibniz wrote some remarks on the Theoria medica vera in 1709, which he had sent to Stahl by Karl Hildebrandt 
von Canstein. Stahl responded to these some months later, but Leibniz was unconvinced. He reiterated his critique 
in the 1711 Replicatio ad Stahl observationes, to which Stahl replied in even greater length. 
6 In the Encyclopédie articles “Fibre” and “Nutrition” (VI, 670; XI, 288) the terms “méchanisme” and organisme” are 
used interchangeably, e.g. “the mechanism or organism of nutrition.” There is no article “Organism(e)” in the 
Encyclopédie, contrary to what is asserted in Ibrahim 1999, 652, an otherwise very useful article (she refers to Enc. 
XI, 360, which is indeed the beginning of the important “Economie animale” article). 
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To be clear, these are not just competing empirical explanations of soul:body or 
whole:parts interaction, both of which would amount to ‘definitions of organism’; they are 
ontologically different. Better put, Leibniz refrains from fully ontologizing the concept of 
organism: “’Organism’ and ‘mechanism’ in Stahl designate two regions of being. Leibniz, on his 
part, hardly says ‘organism’, preferring terms such as ‘organized being’, ‘organized body’ or 
‘organic machine’, because organization is a univocal concept, equally applicable to inanimate 
or artificial beings, and to living beings” (Huneman and Rey, 2007, p. 223). Granted, both 
concepts are opposed to that of ‘machine’, but the mainstream sense of ‘organized body’ or 
‘animal economy’ (Wolfe and Terada 2008) differs from that of ‘machine’ incrementally rather 
than categorically, whereas for Stahl, organism is something unique within Nature as a whole. 
It is not too big a step from this incremental vision of organism as a particular, complex 
arrangement of matter, which we also find in eighteenth-century vitalism, as I discuss below, to 
the project of a science specific to such entities, namely biology (on the shifts involved, both 
terminological, instrumental-material and ontological, see Caron 1988, McLaughlin 2002, Wolfe 
2011). The term ‘biology’ is generally held to have appeared in the 1790s with Lamarck and 
Treviranus, which would then imply roughly a century’s interval between the first technical 
usage of ‘organism’ and that of ‘biology’, from the early 1700s to the late 1790s. But in fact, 
recent work has shown that ‘biology’ appears as early as 1766 (McLaughlin 2002), with then a 
terminological fluctuation for some decades (terms such as ‘zoonomy’ being other candidates) 
– which itself reveals a desire to account for a reality, whether we call it a practical and 
instrumental reality, or an ontological state of affairs.  
For instance, when Caspar Friedrich Wolff seeks to redefine embryology, fifty-odd years 
later, he states that one of the main goals of his “theory of generation” is not just to defend 
epigenesis as an account of the formation of the embryo, but also more broadly, to define a 
science of the causes and effects specific to the formation of organisms (“organized bodies,” 
Wolff, 1764/1966, p. 36f.). What is specific to the embryo and more generally the organism is 
the presence of a force Wolff calls vis essentialis. The oppositional motivation in these classic 
modern concepts of organism, from Stahl to Wolff and beyond, is to produce a model of life 
which is non-mechanical, or not fully mechanical. One can describe them as ‘holistic’, to use an 
early-twentieth century term coined by Jan Christiaan Smuts (although curiously, this term, 
which is associated with systems theory, is not, contrary to a widespread misconception, a 
doctrine specifically about living beings, Wolfe 2010). 
For the holist, the difference between an organism – a flesh-and-blood creature which 
falls ill, resists the challenges of its environment and conversely, assimilates the substances that 
will enable it to survive – and a machine, is a difference between two types of ‘whole’ (as is 
often mentioned, ‘holism’ comes from the Greek holos, ‘whole’). If a living whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts, or conversely, in Aristotle’s example, if a hand cut off from the body is no 
 
9 
 
longer a hand (Metaphysics Z 11, 1036b327), in what Deborah Modrak has described as a 
normative usage of the natural function of an organ (Modrak 1996, 158), by contrast, the inert 
or passive whole of a machine is, for Leibniz as for a variety of thinkers he influences, a mere 
“aggregate” of parts (Wolfe 2006). Holism often, as in the early twentieth-century German 
Ganzheitsbetrachtung, conceives of its object in opposition to ‘mere mechanism’, atomism, 
reduction, and other instances of explanation in terms of decomposition into parts. But the 
historical reality yields a different picture. 
 
3. 
Machine and organism are in interplay here, with the concept of organism being 
articulated, partly (in Leibniz) or wholly (in Stahl), in contradistinction to the concept of 
machine. Two dimensions at least are involved here. One is the type of individuality that is 
being argued for: what kind of individual is the organism? Indeed, all or most theories of 
organism attempt to justify the existence of a particular kind of individuality.  As Claude 
Bernard says, “the physiologist and the physician must never forget that the living being 
comprises an organism and an individuality . . . If we decompose the living organism into its 
various parts, it is only for the sake of experimental analysis, not for them to be understood 
separately” (Bernard, 1865/1984, II, ii, § 1, p. 137). But the other dimension is a kind of 
hybridity or nomadism, in which neither machine nor organism are ‘pure’ or entirely separate 
from one another (Canguilhem 2008). That is, historically, the evidence is in favor of such a 
status of the organism concept. Various examples can be given, but I shall limit myself to four, 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. 
First, words like ‘body’ and ‘machine’ are often defined interdependently, e.g. when 
‘machine’ serves as a synonym for ‘body’ in French. In the late seventeenth century, the 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie defines ‘machine’ in 1694 as “a set of parts or organs which form a 
whole, living or not, and produce determinate effects without transmitting a force externally; 
organism, body” (Cayrou, 1948, s.v. “Machine,” p. 530). By the nineteenth century the situation 
is different, with the Encyclopédie méthodique explaining that one should no longer use the 
expression “machine humaine” … but that “animal economy” or “organism” are suitable 
substitutes:  
It is preferable to use the synonymous expressions ‘living economy’, ‘vital 
economy’, ‘animal economy’, ‘organism’, ‘organic mass’, ‘the entire economy of 
the human body’. The term ‘machine’ seems to refer to a system of causes and 
                                                             
7 The idea is that the material structure of a part per se matters less than ‘where’ it is: “blood will not be blood, nor 
flesh flesh, in any and every state” (Generation of Animals I.18, 722b34); a hand can only be understood as a hand 
inasmuch as it belongs to an ensouled body, i.e., matter animated by a form. Thus the material part, the hand, is 
derivative of the formal part, the soul. It is precisely this mere homonymy between a ‘dead’ hand and a ‘live’ hand 
which Democritus misses, in Aristotle’s view. 
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effects which belongs wholly to the mechanistic theory (“Machine,” Vicq d’Azyr, 
ed., 1808, p. 310). 
Second, as I have discussed elsewhere (Wolfe 2014), even paradigm cases of 
‘mechanism’ or ‘the mechanical philosophy’ (from Descartes and Italian iatromechanism to 
Boyle’s natural philosophy) are filled with functional language, including ‘function’, ‘use’ and 
the ‘office’ of an organ. And they are concerned with properties of the organism such as health 
and survival, that is, not just with microstructure or laws of collision, if ‘medicine is the most 
useful of the sciences’ (this aspect of Descartes comes out strikingly in the essays collected in 
Gaukroger, ed., 2000, including notably Sutton 2000). In that sense, mechanist concepts of Life 
and their (purportedly opposite) organicist rivals in fact exist in a historical, conceptual, and 
instrumental reality which is much more hybrid and ‘dialectical’, in the simple sense that they 
do not function as logical contraries, but as progressive modifications and displacements in the 
project of understanding one and the same object, the living organism. What I describe as 
hybridity and go-betweenness at the conceptual level can of course also be studied in the 
materiality of scientific apparatuses, as Rheinberger has done influentially: “Conjunctures, 
hybridizations, and bifurcations basically describe types of shifts, linkages, and descents 
through which the dynamics of reorientation, fusion, and proliferation of particular 
experimental systems is made possible” (Rheinberger, 1997b, p. 250). But returning to the 
interplay of machine and organism models, we indeed find the same in a case we have been 
conditioned to think of as an opposite: the school of Montpellier vitalism (associated with the 
Montpellier Medical Faculty), especially in the second half of the eighteenth century (Wolfe and 
Terada 2008). 
Third, then, is Montpellier vitalism, the best-known figures of which were Paul-Joseph 
Barthez and Théophile de Bordeu, to whom we should add less famous, but equally significant 
individuals such as Henri Fouquet and Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Chambaud. For present 
purposes, what is significant about the vitalist approach to the organism (which it mainly refers 
to as “animal economy”) is that it is articulated, not by postulating the existence of an invisible 
vital force, but in structural terms, that is, in terms that describe the functional organization of 
a system of living organs, as a kind of extra-complex mechanism with purposive properties. In a 
programmatic article in Diderot and D’Alembert’s Encyclopédie entitled, precisely, “Economie 
Animale,” Ménuret presents those who explain the functioning of the living body by the 
presence of an immaterial soul (i.e., “animists”) and those who reduce the body to a mere 
machine, as equally mistaken: “They did not even pay attention to the organic structure of the 
human body which is the source of its main properties” (Ménuret, 1765, p. 364b). But this 
organic-structural view is not anti-mechanistic: 
everything leads us to believe that the human body is like the other machines 
which art can assemble, disassemble, and witness in their tiniest springs; it is a 
fact known to any artist, that in even the most complex machines, the entire 
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movement rests and bears on one particular piece from which the movement 
began, and from which it spreads to the rest of the machine, producing various 
particular effects in each particular spring. It is only on the condition of such a 
spring in man that we can come to properly know and determine the manner of 
acting of the general causes of life, health, sickness and death (Ménuret de 
Chambaud, 1765, p. 362b). 
Fourth, the most famous case of this twofold vision in which mechanistic and organismic 
levels are intertwined, is probably Claude Bernard, who described the organism as an 
“admirable machine” but also a “living machine” (Bernard 1865, II, ch. i, §§ iii, vii): “[W]hat 
distinguishes a living machine is not the nature of its physico-chemical properties, complex as 
they may be, but rather the creation of the machine which develops under our eyes in 
conditions proper to itself and according to a definite idea which expresses the living being’s 
nature and the very essence of life” (ibid., ch. ii, § 1; Huneman and Wolfe forthcoming). 
 
4. 
In this back and forth of definitions between living body and machine (including, on the 
latter side, anatomical-structural presentations of the body), where sometimes it is the 
components which are conceptualised as so many “little lives” (as in the celebrated vitalist 
metaphor, the organism is like a “beeswarm,” each component of which is already a ‘life’ of its 
own), it is hard to distinguish clearly between the metaphysical level and what we would today 
call the scientific level. For the concept of organism is a porte-manteau concept, on which one 
hang various, rather disparate research programs in physiology, biomedicine and philosophy. 
Even if we say, following Canguilhem that the elaboration of an organism concept “can be 
summed up as the search, by naturalists, physicians and philosophers, for replacements or 
semantic equivalents for the soul, which could account for the increasingly well-established fact 
of the functional unity of a system of integrated parts” (Canguilhem, 1989, p. 551), this does 
not mean it was a straightforward articulation of a neutral, ‘scientific’ concept. Notably, 
because it is also a polemical concept, and often one which belongs to a revisionary program, 
sometimes known as ‘organicism’. 
Organicism, in philosophy and in theoretical biology (itself extending work done earlier 
in embryology, physiology, biochemistry and more recently, ecology and evolutionary biology), 
asserts the existence of an irreducible reality of organisms. In the latter discipline, figures such 
as Walter Elsasser in the 1960s, Robert Rosen in the 1980s, and – with a different, often more 
metaphysically oriented program – Francisco Varela between the 1970s and his death in 2001 
seek to formulate ‘laws’ or systemic regularities that would define the organism, often using 
models derived from physics or dynamic systems theory. In the early twentieth century, the 
organicism of Hans Driesch (often termed ‘neovitalism’) lacks such conceptual tools, and founds 
itself on the challenging experimental ‘evidence’ of the equipotentiality of sea urchin eggs. As is 
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well known, Driesch gradually leaves the domain of biological science for that of metaphysics, 
theorizing the ‘entelechies’ that, on his view, explain these properties.  
In fact, as I indicated above with the case of Montpellier vitalism, there are both 
historical and conceptual reasons to take such strong (ontological) claims with a grain of salt. 
The type of organism concept which emerges with the montpelliérains is explicitly hostile to 
any appeal to mysterious, non-experimentally (or experientially) based entities, not least 
because it comes out of a medical context, implying a focus on living rather than dead bodies, 
and on the living body as a ‘total’ living system rather than as a parcel of decomposable matter. 
As distinguished from ‘strong organicism’, we could call this concept ‘weak organicism’.  
For instance, the erstwhile Dean of the Montpellier Medical Faculty, Paul-Joseph 
Barthez, who had initially spoken of a vital principle in his 1778 Nouveaux éléments de la 
science de l’homme, added a chapter to this work entitled “Skeptical considerations on the 
nature of the vital principle” in the revised edition, stating “I am as indifferent as can be to 
ontology considered as the science of entities” (Barthez, 1806, p. 96, n. 17). Nevertheless, weak 
organicism is still organicism: notably, it will criticize the “mechanists” (in the restrictive sense 
of those who explain the functioning of the body as if it were a machine), not in the name of 
irreducible holism, but for failing to acknowledge or do justice to “the organic structure of the 
human body, which is the source of its main properties” (Ménuret 1765, 364b), by geometrizing 
it. Bordeu speaks of the mechanical analogies popular during the previous hundred years (e.g. 
Descartes, Borelli, Boerhaave) as “the playthings of our fathers”: 
Spare us, once and for all, all these tiny fibres, pressures, globules, thick 
substances, sharp angles, lymph, hammers and all the rest of the equipment 
from mechanical workshops with which [earlier doctors] filled the living body – 
they were the playthings of our fathers (Bordeu, 1764, in Bordeu, 1818, II, p. 
670). 
Strong organicism, which asserts the intrinsic, objective reality of the organism, is clearly 
opposed to a Kantian, projective vision, which inasmuch as it is not an appeal to an intrinsic 
reality,  is also closer to the standpoint of the Montpellier vitalists, but also to Kurt Goldstein’s 
constructivist approach, which emphasizes the inherently constructed character of organisms, 
but also that this constructed character is part of the dynamic activity of organisms (Goldstein 
1934/1995, Ferrario and Corsi 2013). Briefly put, these approaches are non-substantialist like 
the others I have discussed, but in addition, they are specifically constructivist, i.e., they concur 
in defining organism as a meaningful construct, which also comprises the idea of making a part 
of Nature intelligible (or meaningful). In an evocative example suggested by Daniel Dennett, if I 
am being pursued by a tiger in the rain forest, I will be better off treating as an intentional 
agent (an organism, in the present context) rather than as a mere heap of atoms or molecules. 
This will enable me to predict its behavior better and increase my chances of survival (Dennett 
1987; neither Kant nor Goldstein give the idea that our perception is irreducibly organicist, such 
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a Darwinian coloration8). One of the original organicists in the twentieth-century biological 
sense, Joseph Needham, also took this position but from a more ‘total systemic’ standpoint, 
according to which organicism is a stance rather than a theory. For Needham, “all things are 
organisms and all things are atomic systems also. You choose your standpoint,” or in more 
detail, 
Both [mechanism and vitalism] are co-extensive with experience, but one is 
appropriate to science, the other to philosophy; there is no further need for any 
fighting to go on in biology between those to whom the concept of organism is 
the more profound and to those who feel the same about that of mechanism, for 
all things are organisms and all things are atomic systems also. You choose your 
standpoint, and you see what is to be seen from that standpoint (Needham, 
1930, pp. 84-86). 
 
Conclusion 
If the organism is a hybrid but also a go-between concept, is it then just a construct, 
since we are not dealing with absolute, isolable entities or states of being? I have suggested at 
least two reasons why not. One is that there are definitely more ways to study the materiality 
of worms and wombats, but also slime molds, coral reefs and giant fungi, than just as 
metaphors. Another is that these are individual substances, even if their boundaries are not 
always clear or matching up to our common intuitions of what an individual would be 
(Bouchard and Huneman, eds., 2013); as Dupré recently put, “the omnipresence of symbiosis 
should be seen as undermining the project of dividing living systems unequivocally into unique 
organisms” (Dupré, 2012, p. 8). In addition, some biologists call for an organism concept, not as 
an umbrella concept to organize all of some kind of reconceived ‘organismic’ biology, nor as a 
reactive concept against ‘mechanistic’ or ‘reductionist’ science, but simply as a way of doing 
justice to certain kinds of systems (of which termite mounds, with their homeostatic properties, 
are a well-known case: Turner 2006, Turner 2007, ch. 2 and Turner 2013). But these kinds of 
‘reality’ are not grounded on substantivalist metaphysical definitions. 
Further, what I’ve referred to as its hybridity – the way that mechanistic concepts of 
body (e.g. Cartesian physiology) are not without embodied, organismic properties, just as 
vitalistic concepts of, e.g. the animal economy are not without mechanistic specifiable features 
– also presupposes a degree of reality of organisms. This reality in that sense is partly correlated 
with the emergence of biology as a science, even if biologists and philosophers have observed 
more recently (Jacob 1970, Machery 2012) that there is no need for biology to have ‘life’ or any 
                                                             
8 It can also be argued, as Wiggins does, that this capacity of organisms to ‘construct the(ir) world’ meaningfully 
has irreducible nomological properties, but that would, again, be a metaphysical claim concerning the nature of 
certain types of substance, rather than an attempt at the ‘historical epistemology’ of the organism as go-between, 
as proposed here. (I thank Adam Ferner for helping me to see this with regard to Wiggins.) 
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other sharply defined concept at its center; if , that is, “Biology has developed as a discipline 
without having anything terribly precise to say about exactly what its domain of inquiry is,” so 
that “perhaps ‘alive’ is not a crisply delimited category in nature” (Sober, 2003, p. 318).  
An additional layer of hybridity and go-betweenness is the way, e.g. in the Leibniz-Stahl 
debate but also in Claude Bernard, that organism is alternately invoked as a simple natural 
‘case’ which buttresses a metaphysics, or on the contrary as a value-laden entity which stands 
against a ‘merely’ physical world, as is the case, partly, in Kurt Goldstein’s theory of organism. 
Thereby, despite having frequently been pronounced ‘caduc’, irrelevant, reduced to molecules 
or genes, the concept of organism retains a productivity – nomadic but thereby real. Yet this 
perpetuation is far removed from any ‘metaphysics of organism’, or organismic biology.  
Rather than an essence of organism or a substantialist theory (selfhood, subjectivity, 
personhood, continuity, etc.), there is this go-betweenness or nomadism, itself resembling 
some other terms from the history of science, like “boundary concepts” or “trading zones” (Star 
and Griesemer 1989, Galison 1999); to borrow a term from Rheinberger, who applied it to the 
admittedly deliberate constructs he names “epistemic things,” the organism is a “joker” 
(Rheinberger, 1997b, p. 246). If certain conceptual constructs are jokers for the world of 
practice, conversely, certain material-conceptual constructs are also jokers for the world of 
biological theory. As I’ve shown in some select cases (others might choose to focus more on 
Kant, Viktor von Weizsäcker or systems biology), the historian and the philosopher of biology 
might benefit from paying some attention to the organism concept, whether out of interest in 
individuality and organization, or in the emergence of the science of biology. 
 
 
